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pression can be explained by tax evasion. When calibrated to four Southern European economies,
we show that higher degrees of tax evasion within a country, resulting from a higher level of cor-
ruption and a lower penalty rate, yields higher degrees of ¯nancial repression as a social optimum.
However, a higher degree of tax evasion, due to a lower tax rate, reduces the severity of the ¯-
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11 Introduction
Using two dynamic monetary general equilibrium models characterized by endogenous growth, ¯nancial re-
pression and endogenously determined tax evasion, we analyze whether ¯nancial repression can be explained
by tax evasion, based on an overlapping generations framework. We follow Drazen (1989), Espinosa and
Yip (1996), Haslag (1998), Gupta (2007), and Gupta (2008) among others, in de¯ning ¯nancial repression
through an obligatory \high" reserve deposit ratio requirement, that banks in the economy need to maintain.
The study attempts to assay whether there exists a plausible explanation as to why the reserve requirements
in some economies are higher than others. Speci¯cally, we investigate whether ¯nancial repression is an
optimal policy outcome in the presence of tax evasion.
Financial repression was originally coined by economists interested in less developed countries. McKinnon
(1973) and Shaw (1973), in their seminal, but independent, contributions were the ¯rst to spell out the
notion of ¯nancial repression, de¯ning it as a set of government legal restrictions preventing the ¯nancial
intermediaries in the economy from functioning at full capacity. Generally, ¯nancial repression consists
of three elements. First, the banking sector is forced to hold government bonds and money through the
imposition of high reserve and liquidity ratio requirements. This allows the government to ¯nance budget
de¯cits at a low cost. Second, given that the government revenue cannot be extracted easily from private
securities, the development of private bond and equity markets is discouraged. Finally, the banking system
is characterized by interest rate ceilings to prevent competition with public sector fund raising from the
private sector and to encourage low-cost investment. Thus, the regulations generally include interest rate
ceilings, compulsory credit allocation, and high reserve requirements. However, given the wave of interest
rate deregulation in the 1980s, and removal of credit ceiling some years earlier, the major form of ¯nancial
repression is currently via obligatory reserve requirements.1 There is still widespread evidence of ¯nancial
repression, as pointed out by Espinosa and Yip (1996). The authors indicate that the concern is not whether
¯nancial repression is prevalent, but the associated degree to which an economy is repressed, since developed
as well as developing countries both, resort to such restrictive practices.
The motivation for our analysis emanates from a recent paper by Gupta (2008). In this paper, using a
1See Demirg_ u» c-Kunt and Detragiache (2001) for further details.
2Solow-type overlapping generations framework, calibrated to four Southern European countries, the author
analyzed the relationship between tax evasion, determined endogenously, and ¯nancial repression. Gupta
(2008) showed that higher degree of tax evasion within a country, resulting from a higher level of corruption
and a lower penalty rate, yields higher degrees of ¯nancial repression as a social optimum. However, a higher
degree of tax evasion, due to a lower tax rate, reduces the severity of the ¯nancial restriction. In addition,
a higher fraction of reported income, resulting from lower level of corruption or higher penalty rates, causes
the government to in°ate the economy at a higher rate. Money growth rate though, tends to fall, when an
increase in the fraction of reported income originates from a fall in the tax rate.
At this juncture, it is important to put into perspective the study by Gupta (2008) to better understand
our motivation to extend the analysis. Besides, a whole host of other factors2, studies like Roubini and
Sala-i-Martin (1995), Gupta (2005 and 2006) and Holman and Neanidis (2006), by building on the empirical
works of Cukierman et al. (1992) and Giovannini and De Melo (1993), have outlined tax evasion as a possible
rational for ¯nancial repression. However, Gupta (2008) points out that all the above mentioned theoretical
analyzes dealing with tax evasion and ¯nancial repression, su®er from a serious problem, in the sense, that
they treat tax evasion as exogenous. The author stresses that the optimal degree of tax evasion is a behavioral
decision made by the agents of the economy, and is likely to be a®ected by not only the structural parameters
of the economy, but also the policy decisions of the government. Thus, all these models, essentially su®er
from the \Lucas Critique" as they treat tax evasion to be exogenous, when ideally the same should have
been determined endogenously in the model. It must be pointed out that all the above studies, looked at
the optimal policy decisions of the government emanating from its welfare-maximizing objective, following
an increase in the exogenous rate of tax evasion, without specifying what is causing the change in the degree
of evasion in the ¯rst place. Under such circumstances, the optimal choices made by the government are
likely to be non-optimal, since the actual level of tax evasion changes as policy choices change once we realize
that tax evasion is endogenous. Hence, once one determines which policy variables, besides the structural
parameters, are a®ecting the degree of tax evasion, they cannot be available to the government for use to
2Other possible explanations as to why governments across the world would want to resort to ¯nancial repression has ranged
from imperfect information and the possibility of banking crisis (Gupta (2005, 2006) to currency substitution (Gupta, 2007).
3respond optimally to a change in the degree of tax evasion.
Our objectives in this paper are two-fold: First, given that tax evasion is endogenously determined, we
want to see if the results of Gupta (2008) continues to hold under the assumption of endogenous growth, with
the endogeneity in the growth process obtained either via production externalities as in Romer (1986), or
through productive public expenditure, as outlined in Barro (1990); The second of our objectives essentially
follows from the fact that by incorporating a Baro-type model into our analysis, we are allowing for productive
government expenditures , which, in turn, when compared to the Romer-type model, would allow us to
assess the di®erences between the two alternative scenarios regarding the productivity capabilities of public
expenditures.
This paper, thus, extends the work of Gupta (2008), besides, Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Gupta
(2005,2006) and Holman and Neanidis (2006), by, re-evaluating the results in the presence of endogenous
tax evasion, as in Atolia (2003), Chen (2003) and Arana (2004), and endogenous growth. To the best of
our knowledge, such an attempt to rationalize ¯nancial repression based on endogenously determined tax
evasion with the economy growing endogenously in steady-state, is the ¯rst of its kind.
To validate our analysis, as in Gupta (2008), the theoretical model is numerically analyzed by calibrating
it to four southern European economies, namely, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. It must, however, be
noted that our model is a general one and can be applied to any economy subjected to tax evasion. Our choice
of countries has been mainly due data availability. Moreover, it has been argued that the chosen countries
have experience of underground economies and, hence, tax evasion and high reliance on seigniorage, through
high in°ation rates and reserve requirements (Schneider and Klinglmair (2004), Gupta, 2008).
This paper, thus, incorporates endogenous tax evasion in standard general equilibrium models of en-
dogenous growth with overlapping generations. There are two primary assets in the model, namely, bank
deposits and ¯at money. Deposits dominate money in rate of return. An intermediary exists to provide
a rudimentary pooling function, accepting deposits to ¯nance the investment needs of the ¯rms, but are
subjected to mandatory cash-reserve requirements. There is also an in¯nitely-lived government with two
wings: a Treasury which ¯nances expenditure by taxing income and setting penalty for tax evasion when
caught; and the central bank, which controls the growth rate of the nominal stock of money and the reserve
4requirements. In such an environment, we deduce the optimal degree of tax evasion, derived from the con-
sumer optimization problem, as function of the parameters and policy variables of the model. The paper is
organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the economic environment; Section 3, 4 and 5 respectively, are de-
voted in de¯ning the monetary competitive equilibrium, discussing the process of calibration, and analyzing
the welfare-maximizing choices of policy following an increase in tax evasion, resulting from either policy
changes or alteration to a speci¯c structural parameter of the model. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Economic Environment
Time is divided into discrete segments, and is indexed by t = 1, 2, .There are four types of economic
activities: (i) each two-period lived overlapping generations household (consumer/worker) is endowed with
one unit of labor when young, but the agent retires when old. Thus, at time t, there are two coexisting
generations of young and old. N people are born at each time point t = 1. At t =1, there exist N people
in the economy, called the initial old, who live for only one period. The population, N, is normalized to 1.
The young inelastically supplies one unit of the labor endowment to earn wage income, a part of the tax-
liability is evaded, with evasion being determined endogenously to maximize utility, and the rest is deposited
into banks for future consumption. (ii) each producer is in¯nitely lived and is endowed with a production
technology to manufacture a single ¯nal good, using the inelastically supplied labor, physical capital and
credit facilitated by the ¯nancial intermediaries; (iii) the banks simply convert one period deposit contracts
into loans, after meeting the cash reserve requirements. No resources are assumed to be spent in running
the banks, and (iv) there is an in¯nitely lived government which meets its expenditure by taxing income,
setting penalties for tax evasion and controlling the in°ation tax instruments -the money growth rate and
the reserve requirements. There is a continuum of each type economic agents with unit mass.
The sequence of events can be outlined as follows: When young a household works receives pre-paid
wages, evades a part of the tax burden and deposits the rest into banks. A bank, after meeting the reserve
requirement, provides a loan to a goods producer, which subsequently manufactures the ¯nal good and
returns the loan with interests. Finally the banks pay back the deposits with interests to households at the
5end of the ¯rst period and the latter consumes in the second period.
2.1 Consumers
Each consumer possesses a unit of time endowment which is supplied inelastically, and consumes only when
old. Formally the problem of the consumer can be described as follows: The utility of a consumer born at t
depends on real consumption, ct+1, which implies that the consumer consumes when old. This assumption
makes computation tractable and is not a bad approximation of the real world (see Hall (1988)). Consumers
have the same preferences so there exists a representative consumer in each generation. The consumer is
assumed to be risk averse.
For the potential evader, there are (ex ante) two possible situations: \success" (i.e getting away with
evasion) and \failure" (i.e, getting discovered and being convicted). If the consumer is fought guilty of
concealing an amount of income (1 ¡ ¯)ptwt, then has to pay the amount of the evaded tax liability, (1 ¡
¯)¿tptwt and a proportional ¯ne at a rate of µt > 1. Thus, the household incurs transaction costs in order
to evade taxes. Such costs take the form of expenses of hiring lawyers to avoid/reduce tax burdens, and
bribes paid to tax o±cials and administrators. The transaction costs are assumed to be increasing in both
the degree of tax evasion and the wage income of the household. They take the form ´(1 ¡ ¯)2ptwt. A
higher value of ´, would imply a less corrupt economy, implying that it is more di±cult to evade taxes. The
probability of getting caught, 1 ¡ q, is also endogenized, by assuming it to be an increasing function of the
degree of tax evasion. 1 ¡ q takes the following quadratic form:
1 ¡ q = (1 ¡ ¯)2 (1)
Formally, the consumer solves the following problem:
d
d¯
[f1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)2gU(c1
t+1) + (1 ¡ ¯)2U(c2
t+1)] = 0 (2)
where, c1
t+1 and c2
t+1 are the consumption levels when the consumer can evade taxes with success and failure,
6respectively, which can be described mathematically as follows:
c1
t+1 = (1 + rDt+1)[(1 ¡ ¯¿t) ¡ ´(1 ¡ ¯)2]wt (3)
c2
t+1 = (1 + rDt+1)[(1 ¡ ¯¿t) ¡ µt¿t(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ ´(1 ¡ ¯)2]wt (4)
where pt is the price level at time t; wt is the real wage at t and iDt+1 is the nominal interest rate received
on the investments at t + 1. The respective sizes of household real deposit when he or she successfully or
unsuccessfully evades taxes are measured by: [(1¡¯¿t)¡´(1¡¯)2]wt and [(1¡¯¿t)¡µt¿t(1¡¯)¡´(1¡¯)2]wt
respectively. Thus, dt = [(1 ¡ ¯¿t) ¡ µt(1 ¡ ¯)3 ¡ ´(1 ¡ ¯)2]wt gives the size of the expected aggregate real
















Financial intermediaries provide a simple pooling function by accepting deposits at the beginning of each
period. They then make their portfolio decision (that is, loans and cash reserve choices) with a goal of
maximizing pro¯ts. At the end of the period they receive their interest income from the loans made and
meet the interest obligations on deposits received. For simplicity bank deposits are assumed to be one period
contracts. The intermediaries are constrained by legal requirements on the choice of their portfolio (that is,
reserve requirements), as well as by feasibility. Given such a structure, the intermediaries obtain the optimal
choice for Lt by solving the following problem:
max
L;D
¦b = iLtLt ¡ iDtDt (6)
s:t: : °tDt + Lt 6 Dt (7)
where ¦b is the pro¯t function for the ¯nancial intermediary, and Mt > °tDt de¯nes the legal reserve
requirement. Mt is the cash reserves held by the bank; Lt is the loans; iLt is the interest rate on loans,
and; °t is the reserve requirement ratio. The reserve requirement ratio is the ratio of required reserves
7(which must be kept in the form of currency) to deposits received. To gain some economic intuition of the
e®ect of reserve requirements on the banking sector, let us consider the solution of the problem for a typical
intermediary. It is assumed that ¯nancial intermediaries behave competitively and free entry drives pro¯ts
to zero,
iLt(1 ¡ °t) ¡ iDt = 0 (8)





Reserve requirements thus tend to induce a wedge between the interest rate on savings and lending rates for
the ¯nancial intermediaries.
2.3 Firms





where A > 0; 0< ®((1 ¡ ®)) < 1, is the elasticity of output with respect to capital (labor), with kt , nt and
gt respectively denoting capital, labor, and government expenditure inputs at time t. At time t the ¯nal
good can either be consumed or stored. We assume that producers are able to convert bank loans Lt into
¯xed capital formation such that ptikt = Lt, where it denotes the investment in physical capital. In each
of the respective technologies the production transformation schedule is linear so that the same technology
applies to both capital formation and the production of the consumption good and hence both investment
and consumption good sell for the same price p. We follow Diamond and Yellin (1990) and Chen, Chiang
and Wang (2000) in assuming that the goods producer is a residual claimer, that is, the producer uses up
the unsold consumption good in a way which is consistent with lifetime value maximization of the ¯rms.
This assumption regarding ownership avoids the \unnecessary" Arrow-Debreu redistribution from ¯rms to
consumers and simultaneously retains the general equilibrium structure of the models.
8The representative ¯rm maximizes the discounted stream of pro¯t °ows subject to the capital evolution





½i[ptyt ¡ ptwtnt ¡ (1 + iLt)Lt] (12)
kt+1 6 (1 ¡ ±k)kt + ikt (13)
ptikt 6 Lt (14)
Lt 6 (1 ¡ °t)Dt (15)
where ½ is the ¯rm owners (constant) discount factor, and ±k is the (constant) rate of capital depreciation.
The ¯rm solves the above problem to determine the demand for labor and investment. The ¯rm's problem
can be written in the following respective recursive formulations:
V (kt) = max
n;k0 [ptAk®
t (ntkt)(1¡®) ¡ ptwtnt ¡ pt(1 + iLt)(kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±k)kt)] + ½V (kt+1) (16)
V (kt) = max
n;k0 [ptAk®
t (ntgt)(1¡®) ¡ ptwtnt ¡ pt(1 + iLt)(kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±k)kt)] + ½V (kt+1) (17)
The upshot of the above dynamic programming problems are the following respective ¯rst order conditions.
kt+1 : (1 + iLt)pt = pt+1½[A® + (1 ¡ ±k)(1 + iLt+1)] (18)
(nt) : A(1 ¡ ®)kt = wt (19)
kt+1 : (1 + iLt)pt = ½pt+1[A®(
gt+1
kt+1
)1¡® + (1 + iLt+1)(1 ¡ ±k)] (20)
(nt) : A(1 ¡ ®)(
gt
kt
)(1¡®)kt = wt (21)
Equations (18) and (20) provide the conditions for the optimal investment decisions of the ¯rm. The ¯rm
compares the cost of increasing investment in the current period with the future stream of bene¯ts generated
from the extra capital invested in the current period. And equations (19) and (21) state that the ¯rm hires
labor up to the point where the marginal product of labor equates the real wage.
2.4 Government
The government is assumed to be in¯nitely-lived. It purchases gt units of the consumption good. In the
Romer-type model government expenditure is non-productive, while, in the Barro-type model government
9expenditures are productive to the agents. Government expenditures are ¯nanced through income taxation,
penalty rate and seigniorage. In real per-capita terms the government budget constraint can be written as
follows:




Skinner and Slemrod (1985) points out that the administrative costs of penalties is usually quite minor, and,
hence, for simplicity we ignore them from the government budget constraint.However, the costs involved
in auditing the households have been ignored due to the unavailability of information on such costs for
our sample of countries. But adding an extra dimension of cost, merely implies an increase in the public
expenditures and an in°ated level of the policy parameters, without qualitatively changing our results.
3 Equilibrium





stocks of ¯nancial assets fmt;dtg1
t=0, and policy variables f°t;¹t;¿t;µt;gtg1
t=0 such that:
² ¿t, gt, µt, °t, ¹t, pt, rDt+1 and wt, the consumer optimally chooses ¯ such that (2) holds;
² Banks maximize pro¯ts, taking iLt, iDt, and °t as given and such that (9) holds;
² The real allocations solve the ¯rm's date{t pro¯t maximization problem, given prices and policy vari-
ables, such that (18), (19), (20) and (21) hold;
² The money market equilibrium conditions: mt = °tdt is satis¯ed for all t > 0;
² The loanable funds market equilibrium condition: ptikt = (1 ¡ °t)Dt where the total supply of loans
Lt = (1 ¡ °t)Dt is satis¯ed for all t > 0;
² The goods market equilibrium condition require: ct + ikt + gt = yt ¡ ´(1 ¡ ¯)2wt is satis¯ed for all
t > 0;
² The labor market equilibrium condition: (nt)d =1 for all t > 0;
² The government budget is balanced on a period-by-period basis;
10² dt, rdt, rLt, and pt must be positive at all dates.
4 Calibration
In this section, we attribute parameter values to our model by using a combination of ¯gures from previous
studies and facts about the economic experience for our sample economies between 1980 and 1998. We
follow standard real business cycle literature in using steady-state conditions to estimate parameter values
observed in the data. Some parameters are calibrated using country-speci¯c data, while others correspond
to prevailing values from the literature. The calibrated parameters are reported Table 1. A ¯rst set of
parameter values is given by numbers usually found in the literature. These are:
² ¾: the degree of risk aversion, as stated above, is set to 2;
² ®: since the production function is Cobb-Douglas, this corresponds to the share of capital in income.
The values of (1¡®) for all the countries were obtained from Gupta (2008). The values of ® lie between
37.3 percent (Spain) and 47 percent (Portugal);
² ±k: the depreciation rate of physical capital was also obtained from Gupta (2008). The values lie
between 3.2 percent (Greece) and 5.2 percent (Italy);
² µ: the penalty imposed by the government when the consumer is caught evading is obtained from Chen
(2003) and is set to 1.5 for all countries.
² Â: the gross growth rate for each country. Values for all the countries was obtained from Gupta (2008).
The net growth rate values lie between 1.86 percent (Greece) and 2.95 percent for Portugal;
² °: the annual reserve-deposit ratio as a percentage. The values lie between 13.7 percent (Italy) and
23.5 percent (Greece);
² ¿: tax rate, calculated as the ratio of tax receipts to gross domestic product. The values lie between
22.74 percent (Greece) and 36.25 percent (Italy);
² ¼: the annual rate of in°ation. It lies between 7.52 percent (Spain) and 15.16 percent (Greece);
11² iLt: the nominal interest rate on loans. The values lie between 12.89 percent (Spain) and 22.96 percent
(Greece);
² ¯: the fraction of reported income. The values lie between 0.775 (Greece) and 0.81 (Spain and Portu-
gal);
² ¸: the discount factor expressed at an annual rate. It was obtained from Chari et al. (1995) and is set
to 0:98 for all countries.
[INSERT TABLE 1]
A second set of parameters are are calibrated from the steady-state equations of the models to make
them hold exactly: These parameters are:
² ¹: the gross money growth rate is calibrated using the growth rate and the in°ation rate for each
country. The value lies between 1.1030 (Spain) and 1.1730 (Greece);
² ´: the cost parameter measuring the resources spent by the households to reduce their tax burden is
calibrated to ensure that the degree of tax evasion matches the given values of 1 ¡ ¯. The value lies
between 0.3751 (Greece) to 0.6270 (Italy). These values are obtained based on the second root out of
the six. For the other roots, we could not obtain fractional values3. of ´, required to ensure that the
degree of tax evasion corresponds to our calculations made above. As a result, based on our choice of
´, we eliminate the other ¯ve roots.
² ½: the discount factor of the ¯rms is solved to ensure that equations (22) and (24) hold in both
the models for each country. The value ranges between 0.8439 (Portugal) to 0.9209 (Spain) for the
Romer-type model. While, the same ranges between 0.8540 (Portugal) to 0.9205 (Spain);
² A: the value of the production function scalar, is calibrated from the equilibrium conditions to match
the growth rates and the in°ation rates for each country. The value lies between 0.1381 (Spain and
Greece) in the Romer-type model and 1.8346 and 0.2490 (Portugal). While, for the Barro model the
same ranges between 1.4285 (Portugal) and 1.8346 (Spain);
3Either none or imaginary values were obtained for ´ from the other roots
12² b: the government expenditure to capital ratio, is calibrated from the government budget constraint.
The value lies between 0.0172 (Greece) and 0.0363 (Italy) for the Romer-type model, while, the same
value ranges between 0.0174 (Greece) to 0.0364 (Italy).
[INSERT TABLE 2]
5 Welfare-Maximizing Monetary Policy in the Presence of en-
dogenous Tax Evasion
In this section, we analyze whether higher degree of tax evasion would result in an increase in the degree of
¯nancial repression within a speci¯c country. For this purpose, we study the behavior of a social planner
who maximizes the utility of all consumers, by choosing ° and ¹, subject to the set of inequality constraints:
0 · ° · 1, ¹ ¸ 0 and the government budget constraint, equation (26), evaluated at the steady state,
following changes in ¯¤. The social planner maximizes the discounted stream of life-time consumer utility,
speci¯cally with with the discount rate 0<¸<1,
P1
i=0 ¸i[¡f1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)2g 1
(c1
t+1+i) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)2 1
(c2
t+1+i)], given
that ¾ = 2.
First, we derive the optimal values of ° and ¹ for the steady-state values of ¯ =¯¤. These are reported
in Tables 3 and 4. and then analyze the movements of the optimal values of monetary policy parameters,
following a one percentage point increase in ¯¤ solely due to a change in either ´ or ¿ or µ, as three separate
cases. For this purpose, the values of ´, ¿ and µ were re-calibrated, but are not reported in this paper. The
optimal values of the monetary policy variables, corresponding to ¯ =¯¤ and ¯¤ + 0:01, arising solely due
to a change in either ´ or ¿ or µ, are also reported in Table 4.4
[INSERT TABLE 3]
[INSERT TABLE 4]
The following inferences can be made drawn based on the results reported in Tables 3 and 4:
4Note, the model does not analyze the possibility of transitional dynamics following a change in ¯¤. Here, we are merely
interested in ¯guring out the movements of ¹ and ° following a change in the value of ¯¤ across steady-states.
13² In the Romer-type model, a one percentage point increase in the reported income, emerging from an
increase in ´ and µ, causes the optimal value of the reserve requirement (°¤) and the optimal money
growth rate (¹¤) to fall, for all the countries. However, when the increase in the reported income is
due to a fall in the tax rate, °¤ and ¹¤ rise;
² Similar movements of the optimal reserve requirement (°¤) and the optimal money growth rate (¹¤)
are observed for all the countries in the Barro-type model with productive public expenditures;
² Thus, a higher degree of tax evasion, (a fall in ¯¤) does imply higher level of ¯nancial restrictions for
all countries, irrespective of whether government expenditure is productive or not;
In summary, when compared to Gupta (2008), our results regarding the movement of the reserve requirement
is identical. Speci¯cally, we conclude that irrespective of whether we have no-growth or positive-growth in
the steady-state, higher degree of tax evasion within a country due to a higher level of corruption or lower
penalty rates, leads to a higher degree of ¯nancial repression. However, a higher degree of tax evasion due to a
higher tax rate leads to a reduction in the severity of ¯nancial restriction. The di®erence with Gupta (2008),
however, lies in the movement of the money growth rate, and, hence in°ation. Interestingly, the movements
are exactly the opposite, i.e., unlike Gupta (2008), money growth rate moves in the same direction as that of
the reserve requirements following changes in the degree of tax evasion arising out of changes in the penalty
rate, the degree of corruption or the tax rate.
At this stage, it is important to compare our results with that of the work done by Roubini and Sala-
i-Martin (1995). The authors pointed out that governments subjected to large tax-evasion will \choose
to increase seigniorage by repressing the ¯nancial sector and increasing the in°ation rates." In our case
though, this result only holds if the increase in the degree of tax evasion results from a lower penalty rate or
higher level of corruption, i.e., smaller fraction of resources is needed to be spent to evade tax. Hence, our
analysis points out the importance of modeling tax evasion as an endogenous decision. It is also important to
stress that our paper is more comparable to that of the Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) analysis, relative
to Gupta (2008), since we, like Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) base our conclusions on an endogenous
growth model. Hence, our study should be viewed as an analysis which quali¯es the work of Roubini and
14Sala-i-Martin (1995) by pointing out that higher tax evasion leads to higher ¯nancial repression and in°ation
only under certain conditions.
6 Conclusions
Using two overlapping generations dynamic general equilibrium endogenous monetary growth models, we
analyze the relationship between tax evasion, determined endogenously, and ¯nancial repression. Following
the broad literature, we de¯ne ¯nancial repression through an obligatory \high" reserve deposit ratio re-
quirement. The study attempts to assay whether there exists a plausible explanation as to why the reserve
requirements in some economies are higher than others. Speci¯cally, we analyze whether the \high" reserve
requirements are a fall out of a welfare maximizing decision of the government, in an economy characterized
by endogenous tax evasion.
When numerically analyzed for four southern European countries, the following conclusions could be
drawn: (i) Higher degree of tax evasion within a country, resulting from lower penalty rates and higher
corruption, produces socially optimum higher degrees of ¯nancial repression, i.e., a higher value of the
reserve requirement. However, higher degrees of tax evasion, due to higher tax rates, tends to reduce the
optimal degree of ¯nancial repression; (ii) Higher fraction of reported income, resulting from lower level of
corruption or higher penalty rates, causes the government to in°ate the economy at a lower rate. Money
supply growth, however, tends to rise, when an increase in the fraction of reported income originates from
a fall in the tax rate, and; (iii) Finally, ¯nd the results are robust across growth models with or without
productive public expenditures. The only di®erence being that the policy parameters have, higher optimal
values in the latter case.
In summary, from a policy perspective, the model suggests that, an increase in the degree of evasion within
the country, resulting from lower penalty rates or higher corruption, should be followed by an increase in
the reserve requirements and an increase in the money growth rate as part of a welfare maximizing behavior
of the consolidated government. However, higher tax evasion due to higher tax rates, causes the growth
rate of money supply and the reserve requirement to fall. Our paper, thus, concludes that there exists
15asymmetries in optimal monetary policy decisions, depending on what is causing a change in the degree of
tax evasion. More importantly though, tax evasion and ¯nancial repression are positively correlated, if and
only if, the change in the former results from an alteration in the penalty rate or the level of corruption. In
addition, by extending the analysis of Gupta (2008), this paper also shows that irrespective of whether we
have no-growth or positive- growth in the steady-state, higher degree of tax evasion within a country due to
a higher level of corruption and a lower penalty rate can lead to higher degrees of ¯nancial repression. These
results, in turn, also re¯nes the work of Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995), who claimed that higher degrees
of tax evasion always accompanies higher levels of ¯nancial repression and in°ation. As we show here, this
result is contingent upon identifying what is causing the tax evasion to change, and is not always an obvious
outcome.
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18Table 1: Parameters Values (Gupta, 2008)
® ±k ¼ ° ¿ iL ¯ Â
Spain 0.373 0.05 7.52 14.1 25.53 12.89 0.810 1.0254
Italy 0.383 0.052 8.58 13.7 36.25 15.02 0.786 1.0193
Greece 0.402 0.032 15.16 23.5 22.74 22.96 0.775 1.0186
Portugal 0.470 0.05 13.04 19.8 27.73 19.09 0.810 1.0295
Note: Parameters de¯ned as above.
with ¾=2, µ=1.5, and ¸=0.98 (Chari et al. (1995,1996))
Table 2: Calibrated Parameters Values
´ ¹ A ½ b
Romer Barro Romer Barro Romer Barro
Spain 0.5372 1.1030 0.1381 1.8346 0.9209 0.9205 0.0250 0.0250
Italy 0.6270 1.1070 0.1966 1.5210 0.9087 0.9085 0.0363 0.0364
Greece 0.3751 1.1730 0.1381 1.5785 0.8571 0.8566 0.0172 0.0174
Portugal 0.5934 1.1640 0.2490 1.4285 0.8439 0.8540 0.0328 0.0286
Note: Parameters de¯ned as above.
19Table 3: Optimal Monetary Policy Parameters in the Romer-type Model
¯¤ (¯¤ + :01) (¯¤ + :01) (¯¤ + :01)
(´) (µ) (¿)
° ¹ ° ¹ ° ¹ ° ¹
Spain 0.6582 2.1019 0.6575 2.0929 0.6577 2.0930 0.6670 2.1075
Italy 0.6127 2.1229 0.6112 2.1041 0.6120 2.0559 0.6265 2.2280
Greece 0.7012 1.0520 0.6818 1.0500 0.6626 1.0500 0.7497 1.0700
Portugal 0.6974 1.0744 0.6967 1.0600 0.4993 1.0500 0.7044 1.0808
Note: Parameters de¯ned as above.
Table 4: Optimal Monetary Policy Parameters in the Barro-type Model
¯¤ (¯¤ + :01) (¯¤ + :01) (¯¤ + :01)
(´) (µ) (¿)
° ¹ ° ¹ ° ¹ ° ¹
Spain 0.7699 3.6663 0.7697 3.6556 0.7698 3.6516 0.7735 3.7585
Italy 0.9007 2.9619 0.8993 2.8908 0.9001 2.8975 0.9137 3.7991
Greece 0.7644 3.3393 0.7641 3.3314 0.7616 3.2784 0.7669 3.3959
Portugal 0.8960 3.8049 0.8956 3.7133 0.8935 3.4981 0.9049 4.9615
Note: Parameters de¯ned as above.
20